Congressional Record S. 6515 - Cambodia by Mansfield, Mike, 1903-2001
University of Montana
ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Mike Mansfield Speeches Mike Mansfield Papers
5-1-1970
Congressional Record S. 6515 - Cambodia
Mike Mansfield 1903-2001
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches
This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please
contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mansfield, Mike 1903-2001, "Congressional Record S. 6515 - Cambodia" (1970). Mike Mansfield Speeches. 862.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches/862
Uniteg ~f,!lt~s 
of AQ;l,eriea ' 
House fwoeeedings omitted from CongressiofUIJ 
Record of A.pril30, 1970, follow on page H 3791 
<tongrrssional1Rrrord 
PB..OCEBDINGS AND DEBATES OF THB 9 I st <::ON GRESS, SECOND SESSION 
WASHINGTON, FRID~¥~ MAY 1, 1970 
CAMBODIA 
Mr. MAl'{SFIELD. Mr. President, the 
distingu!She<( minority leader "ha,s given 
me a copy of the statement ne made last 
nignt at the conclusion of the address by 
the ~esident of the Vnited States. I ap-
preciate the courtesy of the' distinguished 
.minority le!¢.~r. I think that his state-
ment is a teini>erate one and now would 
like tx> make a statement of my own. 
Mr. President, tqe latest cas~;~a!ty fig-
ures fro1Jl Vietnam as of ~a week ago 
yesterday amounted to a ·total of 322,-
750 casualties. Of that' total, approxi-
mately 50,000 nave· been killed 1n Viet-
nam and Southeast Asia. The rest have 
been wounded. 
I do not have the omc~al figures from 
the Department of Defense yet, but it is 
my understanding that, as "of yesterday, 
appro][im!ii-tely another 100 Americans 
were killed a.nd something on the order 
of 1,2SO ·w~ wounded !liSt week. 
~- President, these figures come to 
my ·omce ~very <Week. i carri'them in my 
POCket< to•· serve as a reminder of the 
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mistaken war in which we are en~taging 
and the tragedy which ha3 been the 
norm during the entire tenure of that 
war. 
Mr. President, I listened with ~tra.ve in-
t-l'rcst to the President of the United 
States speaking to the American people 
about t.hc situation which has developed 
in Cambodill.. Previous to that speech, 
Members of Congress and the Cabinet 
met with the President. He gave us an 
Pxplanation of the situation with refer-
ence to the sanctuaries extending from 
north to south on the Cambodian bor-
der. He gave us, too, the reasons why, on 
t-he acivicP. of his senior advisers, he had 
approved the present operation. 
I a.npreciate the fact that the Presi-
de.:->t did call a number of Congressmen 
t.o the White House to give us this pre-
view. He has exercised his responsibility, 
arrived aL decisions after some days of 
c.onsideratlon and, in announcing them 
t.o 1.he American public, has laid his 
<:ards on the table. 
Mr. Pr!'-~ident, we, as individual Sen-
atnrs and as a Senate, also have respon-
sihiliti<'s to reach conclusions which may 
0r mn.v not coincide with the policy 
emUJ.ciated by the President of the 
United States. I must, therefore, as a 
l'l~>n~t.or from the State of Montana, and 
Iavin!' A.Side all political considerations, 
mn1<t respPCtfufly disa.~tree with the cam-
p~ign jnt.o Cambodia. I could not even 
approve t.he use of U.S. advisory or aux-
1l!ary personnel in connection with what 
ha.d been pre\<iously a South Vietnamese 
incursi0n into Cambodia; how much less 
C;tn I approve of an operation which puts 
Americans in the spearhead? U.S. com-
bR.t. forces have now been sent across the 
l'nrdnr and B-52 bombers are being used. 
Everything we have in our arsenal, at 
lc:>st as it has been used heretofore in 
VIetnam, is now engaged in the so-called 
Parrot<~ Beak of Cambodia which in-
trudes into South Vietnam and is at its 
n<>arest point 35 miles from Saigon. 
This particular sanctuary and other 
l'anct.uaries along the Cambodian fron-
tier have not been set up within the past 
month. They have been a factor in the 
~ituation over the past 3 to 5 years. The 
ur!"sent United States-South Vietnamese 
thrusL into Cambodia, in my opinion, can 
be re:::arded in no other ltght than as a 
widPning of the war and an escalation ot 
f.he cnnfllct. That the operation is liUP-
pn;;;rd to be "temporary" does not in any 
Wll~' alter this evaluation. I have seen too 
fi1A.i1Y so-called temporary operations 
down 1brough the years in that part of 
t.lv~ world. I have watched, too, with con-
cern all roo often the transition from 
t.Pmporary operation to continuinlt oper-
a1.1ons to forgotten operations. 
F.ven if this thrust is successful with-
in the 4 to 8 weeks before the rainy sea-
t<'n begin~. what of other sanctuaries in 
Cambodia. north and south of the Par-
rots Beak? What of Laos? What of North 
Vwt;,.nm itself? Will we undertake tem-
p<Fary incursions into those areas? I! we 
wi:,hdraw after a successful thrust into 
the Pnrrof,~ Beak, does that mean that 
thC' - 'ort.h Vietnamese and the Vietcong 
v. ·ll he free to move in once again and 
e .•:::.'•1ish a rP.p!ica of the previous situa-
tir,n"" 
Mr. President, too many people have 
presented the Cambodian situation as a 
"~tolden opportunity" to save American 
lives and to shorten the war. The stepup 
into Cambodia can do just the opposite. 
It may well lengthen the connict, widen 
it into an Indochinese war, increase U.S. 
costs by billions, increase U.S. casualties 
which now number-to repeat-almost 
50,000 dead and almost 275,000 wounded 
or a total or close to 325,000 American 
soldiers. At the same time, it may well 
accentuate problems at home and in-
crease the divisiveness among our people. 
On April 16, I expressed my thoughts 
on Cambodia at which time I said that 
I did not advocate any kind of aid in 
any form to Cambodia and that we · 
should not become involved in the af-
fairs of that nation. I did so respect-
fully and hopefully. Now the tum has 
been made. The die hM been cast. There-
fore, I must now state in public that I 
am just as interested 8.8 anyone else in 
safe~tuarding U.S. troops in Vietnam and 
elsewhere, but I do not think that this 
new policy, this additional campaign, 
this new ball game is the way to safe-
guard them. Over the years, the curve 
of American casualties has gone up with 
the expansion and intensification of the 
conruct. It has come down with the 
President's order to cut back U.S. troops 
in Vietnam. If there is a way to continue 
to reduce them, therefore, it 1s to con-
tinue the contraction of the Aril.erican 
role and the withdrawal of American 
forces. If there 1s a way, it is for the 
South Vietnamese forces, which number 
pretty close to a m1111on men which have 
been trained and equipped by us, which 
have been, we have been told, pursuing 
a successful process of Vietnamization, 
to protect their border with Cambodia. 
Behind that line, this Nation should not 
only continue its phased withdrawal 
from Vietnam, which I have always ap-
proved, but speed it up. In that fashion, 
the South Vietnamese themselves, all 
factions, may find it expedient to get 
together, determine what kind of a coun-
try they want and delineate their future. 
That is their responsibility, not ours. It 
is their country not ours. 
What confronts this Nation 1n Indo-
china is not a question of saving face. 
It is a question of saving lives. All of 
us have our personal pride, and I would 
hope a fitting sense of humility in light 
of the lives which have already been for-
feited in this tragic war. r do not believe 
there is a Member of the Senate who 
would not eschew the one and gladly 
accept the other if it were in the interest 
of our people to do so. The vital concern 
of this Nation, and I use the word "vital" 
advisedly, must be to end our involve-
ment in the war in Vietnam. It 1s not 
to become bogged down in another war 
in all of Indochina. 
The President's decision on Cambodia 
last night relates directly to these ques-
tions. It was not a political decision. 
Politics has no business In his calcula-
tions on this grave matter anymore than 
it has in ours. In the Senate, today, there 
is no party orientation on the issue of 
Vietnam. There has not been, and inso-
far as I am concerned, there will not be. 
The President has national responsi-
bilities as he made clear in his rem" 
last night. As I have stated, the Se 
has national responsib1lities. Repe. 
action on Vietnam by Members of 1:>.. ,._ 
parties in the Senate have underscor. d 
the nonpartisan character with which 
these responsibilities have been dis-
charged. 
. The President reached a conclusion 
which was his to reach as Commander 
in Chief of the Armed Forces under the 
Constitution. I respect his decision even 
as I regret it and am deeply concerned 
about it. I hope that, as he expects, his 
decision wlll reduce American casualties, 
speed the withdrawal of American troops 
from Vietnam, flnd hasten the end of 
the war. I would be less than honest. 
however, if I did not express the grave 
doubts which I have expressed today on 
these expectations. There is nothing in 
past experience 1n Indochina to suggest 
that casualties can be reduced by en-
larging the area of military operations. 
There is nothing in past experience to 
suggest that the way out of the Viet-
namese conflict follows the road of a 
second Indochina war. Indeed, that road 
may well meander throughout all of 
Southeast Asia and end nobody knows 
where. 
If there is a way, Mr. President, which 
will safeguard the interests of this Na-
tion, it lies in negotiations without 
further delay, negotiations now. The 
spread of the fighting into Laos and 
Cambodia, it seems to me, has put a 
settlement beyond the scope of the Paris 
negotiators. Therefore, the administra-
tion ought not to let drop the Soviet 
Union's recent diplomatic suggestion-
and it has not-that the Geneva con-
ference may have to be reconvened. In-
sofar as I am concerned, there might well 
go forth a call to merge the Paris talks 
into a revival of the Geneva conference 
of 1961-62 on Laos, with the member-
ship of the conference appropriately 
broadened in order to consider the situ-
ation of all Indochina and the Southeast 
Asian mainland. If the Soviet Union is 
reluctant now to pursue the matter after 
having suggested it, then let the call be 
issued by another nation-by this Na-
tion. It is time to ask other Geneva 
conferees to join in a reconvening or to 
set forth alternatives. We will know then 
with whom we can hope to proceed to-
gethet to find a solution by negotations 
and with whom we cannot. 
It is time, too, for this Nation to de-
lineate a clear and unswerving policy in 
support of the neutralization-the guar-
anteed neutralization-of all of Indo-
china, if not the entire Southeast Asian 
mainland. It is time to join with other 
outside powers in bona fide multilateral 
guarantees of the neutrality of the re-
gion. On that basis, this Nation should 
be prepared to terminate forthwith its 
military participation in the various con-
filets on the Southeast Asian mainland. 
to depart militarily therefore and to work 
in concert with others for the restora-
tion of the war's terrible devastation. 
Mr. President, in conclusion I want to 
say that this has not been an easy speech 
for me to make. I have great respect for 
the Office of the Presidency and for any 
individual chosen by the people to hold 
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that o:lllce. I am aware of a.ny Pret~ident's 
-respons1b1lit1es 1n the field of foreign af-
fairs and as CoilUIUI.Ilder 1n Chief. I real-
1ze that the ultimate responsibility lies 
with a President. But I am also aware 
of the fact that as a Sena tor I have a 
direct responsibility to the people of my 
State and that as a Senate we have re-
sponsibilit.ies to the entire Nation. 
Therefore, I must reiterate my belief 
that we are embarked on an ill-advised 
adventure and that there Is grave danger 
the Parrots Beak may wel! turn out to 
be an albatross before it is done. 
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that a speech which I made 1n the 
Senate on AprU 16, 1970, relative to Cam~ 
bodia, be printed in the RECORD at this 
point. 
There being no objection, the speech 
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, 
3.§ follows: 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on yester-
d ay, the preoss carried reports crt a.n urgent 
request for mlllta.ry aid !rom t he government 
which IB now In control In the Ca.InbOdlan 
capital of Phnom Penh. This request comes 
hardly as a surprise. WhP.t Is surprising Is the 
rapidity with which It follows the m!l!ta.ry 
ooup against Prince Slhanouk. · 
In the circumstances. It would be desirable 
to sort out what we know about the Cam-
bodian situation and what we do not know. 
What was !or a decade and a half the only 
oasis o! peace In Indochina has been turned 
Into a bloody battlefield In t.he space of one 
month. The spreading conflict already In-
volves a civil w&r between the Cambodians 
who remain loyal to Prince Slhanouk a.n<1 
those who follow the military government 
which overthrew him. The confiict already 
involves deep lncurslolU! into Cambodia by 
North VIetnamese and Soutr. VIetnamese, an 
extension of the b&ttlefields which had been 
previousiy avoided t hroughout the VIetnam-
ese war. The conftict already lnvol ves the 
potential of an ugly genocide by governm61lt-
stlmuJated mob-action against the eeveral 
hLmdred thousand VIetnamese civllla.n&--for 
the most pnrt farmers, fishermen and trades-
men who come from both North and SOUth 
Viet Nam and who have lived for dec&des In 
reasonable peace In Cambodia. 
In short, the Pandora's Box which waa held 
shut by the leadership a.nd diplomacy or 
Prince Slhanouk la n ow wide open. For yeN'S, 
Cambodia was in the eye of the Indochinese 
hurricane: now It is swept up In the full fury 
of a racial, Ideological and nulltarl.Bt storm. 
It is scarcely a month since the successor 
government claimed authority over Cam-
bodia and this government Is already in deep 
trouble. I ts urgent appeal !or ald Is a broad-
side which has gone to Communist govern-
ments and n on-Communist governments--
apparently, to t.nybody who will give sup-
port. It comes from a government whoee 
earliest acts Include a decla:r..tlon o! martial 
law a.nd a suspension o! personal Uberties 
In a country which did not have martial 
Jaw and which previously had provided a 
greater degree of personal freedom than 
most countries in Southeast Asia. 
While the appeal for aid IB directed to the 
world In general, It Ia reasonable to assume 
that i t is aimed primarily at this country. 
Where e!Be woUld urgent aid of any conse-
quence come from in this situation I! not 
from this nation directly or through nations 
in the area which are supplied by us? 
Some mP.y 1l.nd it difficult to re.slst an ap-
peal for aid to th!B country from any source. 
Some may find the present military govern-
ment more to their llklng than its predeces-
sor a.nd, hence, more "worthy" crt ald. Some 
may ask wh~her thl.s Southeaat Asian coun-
try will topple under the domino theory 11 
we do n ot ret;pond to tho appeal for aid. 
\1;~ · i 
Some may note that it l.s JuSt some arms-a!d<lt 
that l.s being sought, not American forces. 
I! thees observatio= sound fam111ar 1t is 
because they a.re the siren's songs which 
have beckoned U8 time and again ever deeper 
Into the morass or Southeast Asia. If there 
IB ever a time to resist them It Is when 
they are just beginning to bec<>me audible. 
The fact Is that we do not know anything 
of the character or competence of the gov-
ernment In Phnom Penh which has issued 
this appeal !o r ald. We d o not know how 
far its authority exten<ls outside the capital 
or beyond the m.a.in roads. We do not knOW 
whtLt acceptability It may have a.Inong the 
Cambodlllll people. We do not know what 
will emerge In the end In the way of a Cam-
bodian government from the present up-
heaval. 
We do know, or ought to know on the 
basis of experience that even w1th a IJ1111!S1ve 
Infusion or Amerloon equipment we are likely 
to have minimal construct ive etrect on that 
upheaval and we will open the door to ·an-
other destructive impact on our own na-
tional interests. We do know, too. or we 
should know at this late date-after Viet 
Nam, after Laos---that e ach deepening of 
our Invol vement In Indochina began with 
an Input of well-meaning ald. 
President Nixon has made a wise start In 
pointing the national course a way !rom our 
participation In the t ragic war in Indochina. 
It Is to b6 hoped that there will b6 no 
deviation from that course. The way to get 
out Is not to go further In-in a ny way, 
shape or form. The road out of Viet Nam 
foc this nation does not lead by way o! 
arms-supply or a.ny other Involvement ln 
thl.s new extension of the Indochinese t rag-
edy Into Cambodia. 
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